반복되는 비극, ‘관행’이라는 이름의 죽음: 한화에어로스페이스 폭발 참사 분석 > K-wave Trends

The key cause of this explosion is that field workers directly performed pipe repair work, which was the domain of an external professional company. Although the gunpowder sludge generated during the rocket propellant manufacturing process is a very dangerous substance, workers have repeatedly made dangerous attempts to scrape it out with tools to unclog pipes. According to the statement obtained by the police, it appears that pipe blockages in the washing room in Building 56, where the accident occurred, have occurred frequently recently, and it is highly likely that sludge removal work was carried out routinely using a tool called ‘phlegm’ among workers. It is highly likely that this was an arbitrary action that was not specified in the formal standard operating procedures (SOP), and whether the company was aware of the existence of such dangerous work and neglected it will be a decisive issue in determining future legal liability.

Investigative authorities are sending the tools and residues found at the scene to the National Institute of Forensic Science for detailed identification, and are intensively investigating where the ignition point of the accident was and why the safety device to prevent the explosion did not work properly. In particular, Hanwha Aerospace claims to be operating a standard process to wash away gunpowder by dividing the process into three stages, but in reality, it has relied on manual cleaning work without fundamentally solving the problem of gunpowder residue accumulating in pipes. The police are analyzing a large amount of data, about 5,400 items confiscated from headquarters and business sites, and closely contrasting the effectiveness of safety training and the falsity of risk assessment reports. If a company is aware of the risks of work but transfers the risks to internal workers to save time or the cost of calling an external company, it will be difficult to avoid severe punishment under the Serious Accident Punishment Act.

Hanwha Aerospace's Daejeon plant had experienced several explosions prior to this accident and continued to be questioned about its safety management capabilities. Despite the large number of casualties caused by large-scale explosions that occurred in succession in 2018 and 2019, the fact that a similar type of accident occurred again in 2026 proves that the company's safety management system was virtually useless. The company promised extensive safety enhancement measures after past accidents, but workers on site were still forced into an ‘urgent situation’ where they had to manually unclog pipes. This is a structural problem that cannot simply be attributed to the negligence of individual workers, and the company's management, which failed to prevent repeated tragedies, appears to have no justification for avoiding legal responsibility beyond moral responsibility.

Currently, the police and labor authorities are accelerating the investigation by booking officials, including CEO Son Jae-il, on charges of violating the Serious Accident Punishment Act and causing manslaughter through occupational negligence and banning them from leaving the country. As the victims' families are observing the forensic process and demanding to uncover the truth, the investigation team has a responsibility to conduct a thorough investigation that leaves no trace of suspicion. Rather than simply finding mechanical defects, we must clearly reveal why field workers had no choice but to take risks and lift tools themselves, and whether there was management negligence or pressure to cut costs hidden behind it. This investigation should not only resolve this accident, but also serve as a starting point for eradicating all dangerous work methods carried out in the name of ‘customs’ in our industrial sites.